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Sparks v. State, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. 12,
100 P.3d 486 (April 28, 2005)1
CRIMINAL LAW – FAILURE TO APPEAR CLAUSES
Summary
The Nevada Supreme Court held that “Failure to Appear” clauses are not unconscionable
in plea agreements and upheld one in this case.
Disposition/Outcome
The Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment of conviction.
Factual and Procedural History
Jason Robert Sparks was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance
and intent to sell and transport a controlled substance. Sparks entered into a plea bargain with
the State. The plea bargain contained the following Failure to Appear (“FTA”) clause: “I
understand that if I fail to appear for the scheduled sentencing date or I commit a new criminal
offense prior to sentencing the State of Nevada would regain the full right to argue for any lawful
sentence.” Thereafter, Sparks failed to appear for his sentencing hearing and was later arrested
on additional criminal charges. The State asserted its right under the FTA clause and argued for
consecutive prison terms. Sparks filed this timely appeal.
Discussion
The Court began its discussion of the issues by referencing the high standard imposed on
the State for plea agreements: “[the State] is held to ‘the most meticulous standards of both
promise and performance’ with respect to both the terms and the spirit of the plea bargain.”2
Sparks clearly acknowledges that the FTA clause is applicable in this case, however, he argues
that the FTA clause is unenforceable because it is contrary to Nevada law. The Court disagrees.
Sparks first argues that FTA clauses do not follow the written statutory form for plea
agreements set forth in NRS 174.063. The Court refuted this argument by noting that under the
plain language of the statute, a plea agreement must only “substantially” comply with the
statutory form. Thus, the Court opined, the legislature allowed for modifications by merely
requiring “substantial” compliance with the form.
The Court then delved into the legislative history of the statute, even though by the
Court’s own admission it is unnecessary to review legislative history when the language of the
statute is unambiguous, as it is in this case. The legislative history reveals that the legislature
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intended to allow flexibility in plea bargains to “retain some discretion as to the form of the
written agreement, to facilitate the various 'fact patterns' that arise in criminal law.”3
The Court similarly rejected Sparks’ argument that the FTA clause is void under Nevada
case law because it contravenes this court's holdings in Gamble v. State4 and Villalpando v.
State.5 The Court explained that neither case is applicable here because neither case involved a
plea agreement containing an FTA clause or other similar clause. The Court explained that
there were cases, however, that supported its holding in this case. The Court noted that in Citti
v. State it had implicitly approved of a plea agreement containing an explicit reservation of a
conditional right to argue by the State.6 Similarly, in other cases, the Court has recognized that
a defendant is entitled to enter into a plea agreement affecting fundamental rights.7
The Court also rejected Sparks’ next argument, that the FTA clause is unconscionable
because he was not aware of it. Sparks signed the plea containing the FTA clause and also
acknowledged that he had read it. Additionally, the proper time for Sparks to object to the FTA
clause was before he signed the plea.
The Court also rejected Sparks’ argument that the FTA clause is unconscionable because
it gives the State the unilateral right to withdraw from the plea. The Court explained that it is
the criminal defendant who actually controls whether the State will be allowed to argue for a
particular sentence. Further, the FTA clause is reasonable because it relies on the criminal
defendant’s ability to follow the law and show up for his sentencing hearing, which if he cannot
do, should not be rewarded with a lesser sentence from a plea bargain.
Conclusion
The Court held that the FTA clause in Sparks’ plea agreement was lawful and
enforceable. Because Sparks violated the terms of the clause, the Court held that the State
properly argued for consecutive sentences and the State did not breach the plea agreement.
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